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The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol has brought transatlantic differences over 
environmental issues into  the headlines. Since then,  climate change politics has been 
referred to as a prominent example for the development of a transatlantic rift. However, 
transatlantic differences over environmental policy are anything but new. Many of these 
conflicts just have been hidden from public view as they are often concerned with technical 
aspects of regulation and negotiated on the staff level. 
This paper discusses three recent examples of transatlantic conflict over environmental 
policy. Climate change, environmental standards for export credit agencies (ECAs), and 
regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)  have all proven to be  significant 
sources of transatlantic divergences. This is primarily the case because these topics are not 
purely environmental issues, but rather  cross-cutting policy challenges with s ubstantial 
impacts on a number of policy areas. These topics entail  both complex  cost-benefit-
assessments and coordination among different  domestic and foreign policy bureaucracies. 
In order to protect the earth’s ecosystem, climate  change policy calls for adjustments in 
energy production, transport, infrastructure, industry and economics;  climate change, 
however,  also  poses critical questions regarding North-South relations, inter-generational 
equity, and the future of the capitalist system. Likewise, international environmental 
standards for ECAs do not only a ddress ecological concerns in international investment 
decisions, they also create a level playing field for international competition. Finally, the 
regulation of GMOs aims at minimizing the risks of biotechnology for humans and their 
environment; at the same time, however, regulations can  become non-tariff  barriers to 
trade.  
The examples in this paper provide only a glimpse into the broad range of transatlantic 
environmental policy challenges. Yet, each of them represents a pattern for negotiation 
dynamics in other  cases  of transatlantic environmental  negotiations: International 
environmental standards for ECAs are based on a  U.S. initiative; the result of which can be 
regarded as an internationalization of U.S. domestic regulation  entailing high adaptation 
costs for other industrialized countries. In GMO politics we find a counterfactual case: here, 
Europeans have managed to  agree on domestic regulation early and create a set of rules 
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which now serves as a de-facto global standard. These rules are contested by the United 
States which considers them incompatible with its domestic regulations and  impeditive to 
U.S. exports. Perhaps the most interesting case is one which stands in contrast to these two 
examples of alternating leadership roles: in climate change politics, the EU has increasingly 
taken over leadership. After negotiations had emphasized the necessity of U.S. participation 
in the regime for years, the EU now leads this effort  without the United States since 
President Bush’s withdrawal from Kyoto. 
If the leadership role in transatlantic relations is not always and automatically assumed 
by the United States, then the central question is:  under which conditions does which  of 
the transatlantic partners take the initiative and place an environmental issue on the 
international agenda? The first section of this paper is concerned with the conditions for, 
and the importance of assuming a leadership role in international environmental policy. In 
the second part, we highlight the distribution of these roles in the three cases  briefly 
outlined above. Finally, we address the relevance of the lessons learned for the future 
transatlantic relationship within the environmental field. 
 
 
On the Role of Leadership in Transatlantic Environmental Relations  
 
Is the EU primarily a weak actor that takes in dominant global rules and retransmits them down 
to national polities in a coordinated fashion? Or does the EU have a will and power of its own? 3  
 
When environmental policy first came onto the agenda, the United States and (Western) 
Europe  often took  similar  positions.  This, h owever,  has changed  during the past two 
decades, a nd the relationship has been increasingly marked by disagreement. Table 1 
provides an overview of environmental issues  with the  potential for transatlantic conflict 
and the distribution of roles amongst both actors on these issues.  
Historically, the United States  can claim most environmental policy innovations, both 
domestically and internationally. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 
served as a catalyst and model for environmental regulation in many countries – including 
most of Europe.  Similarly, European states imported U.S. regulations regarding a wide 
array of particular  environmental problems;  European automobile emission standards, for 
example, are a wholesale adaptation of U.S. standards  requiring catalytic converters as 
early as 1974. While some of these regulatory innovations diffused to Europe by imitation, 
others were intentionally internationalized by the United States. 
US  leadership on the  environment was most visible in the 1970s. Yet, s ince the 
beginning of the  Reagan administration, the U.S. record has become tainted and less 
predictable: where the country had been a leader in ozone protection, it was also as the most 
prominent laggard with regard to the protection of the high seas, international waste and 
biodiversity management, and climate change. As indicated by the 1990 Clean Air Act 
amendments or the environmental standards for ECAs discussed below, the United States is 
 
                                                   
3 Tiberghien, Yves/ Starrs, Sean. (2004): The EU as Global Trouble-Maker in Chief: A Political Analysis of EU 
Regulation and EU Global Leadership in the Field of Genetically Modified Organisms. Paper presented at the 
2004 Conference of Europeanists, Organized by the Council of European Studies (CES). Chicago. 3 March 2004. 
2. Conflict or Cooperation? Transatlantic Relations in the Environmental Field  3 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
 
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
f
o
r
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
 
c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
 
 
 
I
s
s
u
e
 
a
r
e
a
 
T
i
m
e
f
r
a
m
e
 
I
n
i
t
i
a
t
o
r
 
L
e
a
d
e
r
 
T
y
p
e
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
C
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
H
i
g
h
 
S
e
a
s
 
1
9
8
2
:
 
U
N
 
C
o
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
 
U
S
A
 
a
m
o
n
g
 
o
t
h
e
r
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
e
a
t
y
;
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
c
e
;
 
 
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
t
o
 
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
 
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
L
a
w
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
S
e
a
 
 
 
n
o
t
 
r
a
t
i
f
i
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
s
e
a
b
e
d
 
m
i
n
i
n
g
 
S
t
r
a
t
o
s
p
h
e
r
i
c
 
1
9
8
5
:
 
V
i
e
n
n
a
 
C
o
n
v
e
r
n
-
 
1
9
7
8
:
 
U
.
S
.
 
F
i
r
s
t
 
U
S
A
;
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
e
a
t
y
;
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
c
e
 
I
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
y
 
T
o
r
o
n
t
o
 
G
r
o
u
p
 
(
U
S
A
 
 
O
z
o
n
e
 
D
e
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
 
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
b
a
n
 
o
n
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
t
h
e
1
9
9
0
s
 
 
a
n
d
 
o
t
h
e
r
s
)
;
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
t
o
o
k
 
o
v
e
r
 
 
 
t
h
e
 
O
z
o
n
e
 
L
a
y
e
r
 
C
F
C
s
 
i
n
 
a
e
r
o
s
o
l
 
 
 
l
e
a
d
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
o
n
 
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
1
9
8
7
:
 
M
o
n
t
r
e
a
l
 
P
r
o
t
o
-
 
s
p
r
a
y
s
 
 
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
s
 
 
c
o
l
 
S
p
e
c
i
e
s
 
1
9
7
3
:
 
C
I
T
E
S
 
1
9
6
9
:
 
U
S
 
U
S
A
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
e
a
t
y
;
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
c
e
 
P
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
 
E
n
d
a
n
g
e
r
e
d
 
 
 
 
 
S
p
e
c
i
e
s
 
A
c
t
 
 
1
9
9
2
:
 
B
i
o
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
1
9
8
7
:
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
e
a
t
y
;
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
c
e
;
 
 
 
M
o
d
e
l
e
d
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
U
N
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
 
C
o
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
r
e
q
u
e
s
t
s
 
 
n
o
t
 
r
a
t
i
f
i
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
p
r
o
p
o
s
a
l
 
 
 
U
N
 
e
x
p
e
r
t
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
 
 
 
1
9
9
9
:
 
C
a
r
t
e
g
e
n
a
 
P
r
o
-
 
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
e
a
t
y
;
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
c
e
;
 
 
 
P
r
e
c
a
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
P
r
i
n
c
i
p
l
e
 
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
 
t
o
 
 
t
o
c
o
l
 
 
 
n
o
t
 
r
a
t
i
f
i
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
E
U
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
F
o
o
d
 
1
9
8
5
:
 
E
U
 
B
a
n
 
o
n
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
E
U
 
 
E
C
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
1
9
9
6
:
 
M
o
d
e
l
e
d
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
E
U
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
S
a
f
e
t
y
 
h
o
r
m
o
n
e
s
 
i
n
 
b
e
e
f
 
 
 
W
T
O
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
r
u
l
e
d
 
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
 
E
U
,
 
W
T
O
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
s
 
S
P
S
 
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
b
u
t
 
E
U
 
d
o
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
c
o
m
p
l
y
 
i
n
c
o
m
p
a
t
i
b
l
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
r
e
c
a
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
l
e
 
 
1
9
9
4
:
 
S
P
S
 
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
U
S
A
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
e
a
t
y
;
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
c
e
 
R
i
s
k
 
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
 
c
o
m
p
a
t
i
b
l
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
U
.
S
.
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
l
e
s
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
t
i
b
l
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
w
i
t
h
 
E
U
 
p
r
e
c
a
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
l
e
 
H
a
z
a
r
d
o
u
s
 
W
a
s
t
e
 
1
9
8
9
:
 
B
a
s
e
l
 
C
o
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
U
N
E
P
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
n
 
s
t
a
t
e
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
e
a
t
y
;
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
c
e
;
 
 
 
D
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
h
a
z
a
r
d
o
u
s
 
w
a
s
t
e
 
n
o
t
 
 
 
 
 
n
o
t
 
r
a
t
i
f
i
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
t
i
b
l
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
U
.
S
.
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
C
h
e
m
i
c
a
l
 
1
9
9
8
:
 
R
o
t
t
e
r
d
a
m
 
 
1
9
7
6
:
 
U
.
S
.
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
e
a
t
y
;
 
n
o
t
 
S
a
f
e
t
y
 
C
o
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
T
o
x
i
c
 
S
u
b
s
t
a
n
-
 
 
r
a
t
i
f
i
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
 
2
0
0
1
:
 
S
o
c
k
h
o
l
m
 
c
e
s
 
A
c
t
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
,
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
e
a
t
y
;
 
n
o
t
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
w
a
n
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
e
x
e
m
p
t
 
 
 
C
o
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
(
P
O
P
s
)
 
 
 
r
a
t
i
f
i
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
m
o
r
e
 
 
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
c
e
s
 
 
2
0
0
1
:
 
P
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
 
E
U
 
 
E
U
 
 
P
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
 
E
U
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
r
e
g
u
-
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
e
 
U
.
S
.
 
l
o
b
b
y
i
n
g
 
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
E
A
C
H
 
 
 
l
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
n
o
n
-
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
;
 
R
E
A
C
H
 
i
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
 
o
n
g
o
i
n
g
 
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
 4  Alexander Ochs und Marcus Schaper 
   
still active in environmental policy. However, the EU 4 has caught up in many areas; it has 
become  more innovative domestically, and  increasingly  initiates and influences 
international environmental politics. 5 
Taking the initiative in international environmental politics  is of key importance. The 
first party to the table first can set the agenda on a particular issue according to its own 
preferences and interpretation, as well as determine the parameters for solutions. Alternate 
proposals and critiques suggested by later parties must be in terms of the original proposal; 
i.e. they are formed, voiced and evaluated against the benchmark set by the initial proposal. 
The United States has historically occupied the dominating position within the transatlantic 
relationship most importantly because it has been able to  articulate its interests clearly. 
Europeans, on the other hand, have often defined their position only in reaction to the U.S. 
proposal. C onsequently, the United States  has come dominate the agenda, timing, and 
outcome of negotiations, whereas the EU and its member states have only been able to  
modify American proposals at best. 
U.S. influence has been most strongest in the face of fragmented EU reactions to U.S. 
initiatives  – i.e., when there is no  joint  European position but a number of individual 
standpoints. This is most often the case when the  EU Commission cannot act on behalf of 
member states due to either their disagreement or a lack of political responsibility for the 
policy area in question. In such cases, the United States has been able to “divide and reign” 
by forging ad hoc coalitions with individual European states, and thereby undermining 
otherwise concerted European resistance to U.S. initiatives. This tactic is well illustrated by 
the following account of negotiations  on  environmental standards for ECAs  observed 
below. 
Environmental n egotiations have  often taken this path. However, transatlantic 
dynamics seem to be changing: the EU is becoming increasingly proactive and increasingly 
unwilling to  shy away from open  transatlantic  conflict on issues it considers important. 
Environmental policy has established itself as one sector outside trade in which Europeans 
act as equal partners to the United States. In the case of GMO regulations, the EU has 
established strict domestic rules which have evolved to a de facto global standard; the 
Unite d States, in contrast, has found itself on the defensive, and has been unable to modify 
European GMO regulation in a way  that would  make it compatible with domestic U.S. 
rules. 
In discussing the protection of dolphin and turtles in two case studies examining tuna 
and shrimp fishing, Elizabeth DeSombre  identifies U.S. market power as a strong predictor 
for successful U.S. internationalization  of  domestic rules. If the U.S. market is of central 
                                                   
4 In this paper we treat the United States and the European Union as functionally equivalent with respect to their 
foreign environmental policy. This is, of course, a gross simplification of political processes; however, we address 
the EU’s supranational character by defining coalition-building among EU member states as a necessary condition 
for EU initiatives at the international level. 
5 Some analysts describe this as a flip-flop between U.S. and European leadership while others such as Jonathan 
Wiener speak more nuanced of a hybridization: Wiener, Jonathan B. (2004): Convergence, Divergence, and 
Complexity in US and European Risk and Regulation. In: Vig, Norman J./ Faure, Michael (2004): Green Giants? 
Environmental Policies of the United States and the European Union. 73-109. A good overview of regulatory 
innovations is provided by: Vig, Norman J./ Faure, Michael. (2004): Green Giants? Environmental Policies of the 
United States and the European Union. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, as well as Schreurs, Miranda (2002): 
Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United Stat es. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For a 
detailed discussion of transatlantic environmental relations see: Schreurs, Miranda/ Selin, H enrik/ VanDeveer, 
Stacy D. (eds.) (forthcoming): Enlarging Transatlantic Relations.  Conflict or Cooperation? Transatlantic Relations in the Environmental Field  5 
importance  to  the producers of the commodities to be regulated, then a domestic U.S. 
standard can become a de-facto international norm; this is due to its ability to deny products 
access to the U.S. market if they do not conform to the standard.6 DeSombre’s  argument 
also seems to apply to European GMO standards up until now; they have become a de-facto 
global standard because of the importance of the EU market for food producers worldwide. 
DeSombre further argues that a n  American  push for international agreements 
expanding its policies beyond U.S. borders can be expected when environmental activists 
(“baptists”) and industry (“bootleggers”) join forces.7 A U.S. initiative is most likely when 
the U.S. has comparatively strict regulation at home, and when an int ernationalization of 
these domestic rules would help both the environment abroad and industry at home . 
DeSombre’s analysis is helpful in identifying conditions under which the United States 
will internationalize domestic regulations  concerning particular commodities. It has the 
potential to be  applied to European initiatives  – as in the case of GMOs  – if one adds 
coalitions among the member states  as a  central condition  to agreement among organized 
interests. DeSombres’  model, however, appears to be less helpful when broader 
environmental regimes are to be created which are not limited to regulating  the 
environmental impacts of certain products and commodities. With regard to international 
climate change politics and environmental standards for ECAs, neither the United States 
nor the EU could rely on its market power to achieve their objectives. A solution was only 
possible through negotiation. 
Under which conditions will a government take on the role of initiator in international 
environmental politics?  For  Peter Haas, this is not an easy question to answer. He  
comments on the United States: 
 
[The United States] is widely admired for its record of introducing some of the world’s strongest 
domestic environmental standards, which are emulated abroad, including path-breaking 
environmental reporting standards and environmental impact assessment requirements for public 
projects. Yet the US record of foreign environmental policy since 1972 is erratic; seemingly 
unrelated to administration.
8 
 
Haas attributes his observations to the specific constellation of a number of factors:   
 
bureaucratic discretion and inertia, scientific consensus, avoiding heavy economic burdens on 
the US economy from compliance, domestic industries’ opposition to expensive pollution 
control regulation, and organized public concern amplified by NGOs. When consensus exists 
and  executive branch bodies enjoy some discretion then the US is likely to be a leader. When 
consensus is absent, economic costs are heavy, and industry opposition is powerful than the US 
will be a laggard.
9 
 
According to Haas, the question of who will assume a leadership role in negotiations is less 
a function of different shades of  “greenness” on  the part of  either side, but rather a 
consequence of the characteristics of the particular issues and the constellation of domestic 
                                                   
6 DeSombre, Elizabeth R. (2000): Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry, 
Environmentalists, and U.S. Power. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 247. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Haas, Peter M. (2003): Environment Multilateralism and the United States. Amherst, MA: University of 
Massachusetts. 
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actors and interests involved. In fact, in two of the cases observed below, the initiator bases 
its international proposal on broad pre-existing coalitions at home. The U.S. initiative for 
environmental standards for ECAs was supported by industry and environmental activists; 
similarly, the EU Commission represented a unified Europe on GMOs. 
It seems to be insufficient, however, to seize the initiative on an issue. As  will be 
discussed in the case of climate change politics, in the course of negotiations a particular 
actor’s influence can  change as dramatically as the distribution of roles among actors. U.S. 
leadership on climate change  – which had all along determined by the sheer importance of 
the country rather than its political  appetit e for  action  – was  eventually  severely 
undermined  when the U.S. Senate weakened the U.S. delegation’s mandate at the Kyoto 
negotiations. The climate change negotiations  also show how a party can gain  increasing 
leadership; moreover, the joint European position  has only evolved  and solidified  over the 
years. To the surprise of many observers, the EU has been ultimately able to save the Kyoto 
agreement, even after the United States had turned its back on the protocol. 
 
 
Three Examples 
 
Environmental Standards for Export Credit Agencies 
 
Export credit agencies are agencies which support exports into high-risk markets by 
enabling the financing of high-risk transactions. Some ECAs act as public banks, and offer 
better terms for high-risk transactions than private financers could for such projects. Others 
operate as insurers by absorbing some of the risk, thereby making private bank financing of 
these transactions viable. All ECAs operate under a public mandate; some (like the U.S. 
Export-Import Bank) are public agencies, whereas the administration of export credits in 
other states has been outsourced to private sector companies. The German 
Hermesdeckungen, e.g., are provided by a consortium consisting of Euler-Hermes and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, under contract with the Federal Government. 
Overall impact of ECA support on trade is small; however, this kind of backing is 
crucial for infrastructure projects with potential environmental impacts. In Germany, 3 per 
cent of its total export volume is supported with Hermes cover. ECA significance becomes 
more apparent when considering exports to developing and transition countries: 20 per cent 
of German exports to these countries is ECA-facilitated.
10 ECAs play an important role in 
financing large-scale infrastructure projects in those countries typically characterized by a 
combination of high commercial and political risk. Because of their long repayment terms, 
financing for such projects is often unavailable on the private market at reasonable terms. 
At the same time, large infrastructure projects can  also  have serious impacts on the 
natural environment. The contentious Three Gorges Dam in China, for example, could only 
be built with the support of a number of European ECAs. The U.S. Export-Import Bank, 
however, refused support this project, citing serious environmental impacts which were not 
consistent with its policies. 
In 1995, environmental standards for the Export-Import Bank came into effect after 
Congress had demanded the development of such policies in its 1992 reauthorization of 
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ExIm. With these unilateral standards, U .S. exporters were faced with a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis their European contenders; projects for which they sought support 
now needed to be evaluated for environmental impacts which had to comply with U.S. 
standards. Consequently, since the mid 1990s, the United States has sought to establish 
international environmental standards for ECAs which would require other states to 
implement environmental policies similar to the U.S. ExIm requirements. 
 
 
Negotiations in the OECD Context 
 
Environmental standards for ECAs are a good example  of  the successful 
internationalization of domestic U.S. regulations. The United States first raised the issue of 
harmonizing environmental conditions for ECA-supported projects in technical OECD 
committees; the United States then elevated  it to the heads-of-state level at the Denver G7 
summit in 1997. From 1998 on, the OECD’s Export Credit Group (ECG) was tasked with 
negotiating an agreement on environmental standards and procedures for export credit 
agencies. In 2001, these negotiations resulted in the Draft Recommendation on Common 
Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits (Revision 6)  – or 
commonly referred to as Common Approaches. These recommendations were supported by 
all members of the Export Credit Group, with the exception of the United States and 
Turkey. All other members voluntarily implemented  the Common Approaches from 2002 
on. The United States refused support on the grounds that the recommendation fell short of 
U.S. goals for binding standards and transparency. The agreement called for a revision of 
the Common Approaches in 2003. Renewed negotiations in the fall of 2003 resulted in a 
revised version, passed by the OECD Council in December.  Since  1  January 2004, the 
current Common Approaches are providing the international basis for national standard-
setting; the next revisions are to take place in 2006. 11 
European states did not produce a coordinated response to the U.S. initiative and 
negotiated largely independently of each other. The Un ited States took advantage of these 
disagreements and pulled individual European states to its side. What resulted was an 
agreement closely resembling the U.S. initiative, despite the strategic advantage European 
states had at the outset of negotiations. European companies had a competitive advantage in 
the absence of an agreement. 
In essence, negotiations addressed two related issues: (i) minimum standards for 
project evaluation, and (ii) transparency of the evaluation process prior to coverage 
decisions. Negotiations on standards were about establishing binding criteria and processes 
for assessing the environmental impact of projects. Regarding transparency, different states 
had very different policies in place prior to the 2003 agreement: only some ECAs, e.g. the 
U.S. Export-Import Bank, made the results of environmental assessments publicly available 
or consulted with NGOs; other ECAs, among them most of the European agencies, argued 
that such transparency was not possible due to commercial confidentiality concerns. 
                                                   
11 For a detailed discussion of transatlantic negotiations on environmental standards for ECAs see: Schaper, 
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In the negotiations leading to the Common Approaches, states dealt not only with the 
U.S. initiative  at the international level, but  also with demands by consitutents at the 
national level. A number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been active on 
the issue of ECAs and the environment since the early 1980s; these NGOs have  long 
demanded that ECAs stop support of environmentally destructive projects. Domestic U.S. 
standards and Swiss policies requiring  consultation of civil society actors can be attributed 
to these early NGO activities. In the 1990s, an international coalition of NGOs active on 
ECAs grew out of the World Bank reform campaign. These NGOs have influenced the 
negotiations in the OECD context at both the international and the domestic level. In Paris, 
they were involved in consultations with the Export Credit Group; domestically,  they  
targeted those government which moved least in the OECD. Results of this second phase of 
NGO pressure, combined with the ongoing international negotiations, include national 
environmental standards for ECAs in a number of European states. 
These national standards differed in scope and stringency and thus provided NGOs 
with the opportunity to pit ECAs against each other in comparisons of national standards. 
However, these divisions were exploited  not only by NGOs but also by the United States. 
Germany  on the one hand, staunchly  opposed both transparency rules and firm 
environmental standards throughout most of the negotiations;  France and  the United 
Kingdom on the other hand, were more open to the U.S. proposals. The French ECA 
Coface already had relatively progressive environmental standards in place since 2000; 
these provided an incentive to establish minimum  standards at the international level. 
UK negotiators cooperated with their American colleagues by placing proposals on the 
agenda that the U.S. delegation feared would fail had the Americans themselves been the 
initiators. This can be explained partially by the composition of the British ECA’s (ECGD) 
portfolio: Since much of ECGD’s business is with arms and commercial aircraft (which are 
not subject to the Common Approaches), standards and transparency rules would have only 
marginally effects on its own business. Additionally, ECGD had already long required its 
clients to disclose environmental impact assessment information. 
 
 
Assessment of the Negotiation Results 
 
During the first part of negotiations, Germany was successful in organizing coalitions 
against U.S. proposals ,  thus  making possible the stalemate on the 2001 Common 
Approaches. Later on, the U.S. delegation, with French and British support, managed to 
secure a stronger position in the Export Credit Group. In fall 2003, this “divide and reign” 
strategy paid off; it resulted in the adoption of the revised Common Approaches which 
reflected both major U.S. negotiation objectives: environmental standards and ex-ante 
transparency. States opposing the U.S. initiative managed to bargain for flexibility in the 
provisions and thereby create a few loopholes, but overall, the agreement was built around 
the U.S. proposal. The results entailed significant adaptation to domestic ECA rules on the 
part of the European states with regard to both standards and transparency; but demanded 
only little modification from the side of the United States. 
Despite this lopsided distribution of gains and losses, the United States managed to 
push its initiative through negotiations with only minor adjustments. This success was the 
result of both a clever negotiation strategy and the lack of unity among the European states. Conflict or Cooperation? Transatlantic Relations in the Environmental Field  9 
The European states did not manage to forge coalitions against U.S. initiatives, although 
they would have collectively profited from such a strategy. Failure of negotiations would 
not have resulted in change to the status quo – i.e. the continued competitive disadvantages 
for U.S. companies, and the consequent avoidance of adjustment costs for the Europeans. 
 
 
Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms 
 
The EU has assumed a leadership role in establishing rules for the approval, labeling, and 
cultivation of GMOs. However, the EU  procedures  are in conflict with U.S. regulation 
which treats GMOs as functionally equivalent with conventional varieties and does not 
provide for GMO-specific rules. These regulatory differences and their effects on trade in 
GM-foods have established the issue in a prominent slot on the transatlantic agenda. For the 
EU, food safety and consumer protection are crucial concerns in this conflict; the United 
States, however, interprets EU rules primarily as unilateral protectionist measures. From its 
point of view  the safety of GMOs has been established beyond doubt. 
This transatlantic conflict does not come as a surprise given the lopsided distribution 
of acreage cultivated with GM crops. The United States is the world’s largest producer of 
GM crops with 66 per cent of global acreage. In addition to the United States, Argentina 
(23 per cent), Canada (6 per cent), and China (4 per cent) also have significant GM 
farming. The remaining 1 per cent of global GM acreage is shared by the rest of the world – 
including the EU.
12 
 
 
European and U.S. GMO Regulation 
 
European Policy on GMOs  was  anything but unified in the beginning.  In the 1980s 
Commission policy was primarily aimed at supporting the nascent European GMO industry 
and little regulation occurred. Between 1991 und 1998 the EU approved 18 GM varieties – 
including the controversial Novartis Bt-11 corn, which eventually led to the open split 
between the Commission and GM-critical member states.  Only in 1997 did t he 
Commission shift its focus to developing GMO regulation in dialog with the member states. 
The 1998 moratorium on the approval of new transgenic varieties was part of this new 
Commission strategy and made possible the definition of new unified European rules 
rooted in the Precautionary Principle. Thus the moratorium facilitated a unified and well 
articulated European position.
13  
Most countries regulate GMOs under a regime specifically created for these varieties. 
However, the United States is an outlier (along with Australia) in this regard as it regulates 
GMOs within the framework created for traditionally bred varieties. Furthermore, most 
countries start from the assumption that GMOs may carry a potential risk that needs to  be 
disproved before a variety is approved; the United States, to the contrary, starts from the 
regulatory presumption that GMOs are harmless unless proven otherwise. Vicente Paolo B. 
Yu III has surveyed GM rules in sixteen different polities and has found the United States 
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to be the only polity that shows both of these regulatory characteristics.14 In addition to the 
restrictive approval process rooted in the Precautionay Principle, the EU and many other 
countries require the labeling of foods containing GMOs. In the United States, voluntary 
GM-free labels exist (similar to U.S. organic food labels), but the United States considers 
mandatory labeling a trade barrier. Given its regulatory approach that considers traditional 
and GM varieties as equivalent it comes as no surprise that the United States consider such 
labels unnecessary barriers to trade.  
 
 
Internationalization of EU Regulation 
 
Shortly after finding a common position on  GMOs the EU managed in 1999 to 
internationalize the Precautionary Principle in the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety. This 
step institutionalized a basic principle of European environmental policy in an international 
treaty as a guiding principle for international GMO rules. However, the Cartegena Protocol 
is mainly concerned with the transboundary movement of living modified organisms 
(LMOs) in an effort to preserve natural biodiversity but it does not regulate GMOs in food. 
The protocol establishes the Advanced Informed Agreement Procedure for transboundary 
movement of LMOs. According to this rule, the importing country needs to consent to the 
importation of LMOs before they may leave their country of origin. This applies primarily 
to seeds, plants, and animals , but only indirectly to GMOs that are intended for direct 
consumption or further processing. Thus, the Cartegena Protocol is not directly applicable 
to food safety, but it is considered a successful internationalization of EU regulation 
nevertheless.  
In the transatlantic controversy over GMOs, the EU seeks to have the WTO dispute 
settlement panel consider the Cartegena Protocol as internationally recognized rules for 
GMOs. The use of grains as either seeds or foodstuffs illustrates how closely rules for 
LMOs are related to those for GMOs: GM grains, which were originally intended for 
human consumption can be sewn, cross out in the field, and ultimately pollute conventional 
harvests.15 
 
 
The Transatlantic Conflict 
 
The United States is not party to the Cartegena Protocol and it considers the Precautionary 
Principle to contradict the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
which requires health-related trade measures to be based on sound science. Both the EU 
and the United States have ratified the SPS Agreement. Though the SPS Agreement 
contains a weak version of  the Precautionary Principle in Article 5(7), it allows such 
                                                   
14 Yu III, Vicente Paolo B. (2001): Compatibility of GMO Import Regulations with WTO Rules. In: Brown Weiss, 
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15 A report by the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (part of NAFTA) on unintentional 
outcropping of GM maize varieties in Mexico provides an example for such a case. CEC Report on GM Maize in 
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precautionary trade measures only under specific conditions and requires them to be 
provisional. 16 
The product of the European regulatory process is a set of rules that are not compatible 
with American regulation in this field. On top of this domestic regulatory regime, an 
international one has evolved with the Cartegena Protocol, that is more in line with the 
European Precautionary Principle than with U.S. risk assessment procedures. Additionally, 
there is a global dimension to this  transatlantic conflict: states in Africa and elsewhere have 
established regulation that is similarly restrictive as in the EU guided by the motivation to 
keep their conventional varieties free of GMOs and thus to retain their ability to export their 
produce to the EU. This has even prompted African states to refuse U.S. food aid which the 
United States could not or did not want to guarantee to be GMO-free. 
The bold EU policy on GMOs left few options for the United States to avert the 
establishment of a de-facto global standard. The  United States and the EU had been in 
constant discussions concerning EU regulation of GMOs, “including the creation of an EU -
US Biotechnology Forum which issued a joint report on the subject in December 2000 as 
well as a Biotech Working Group within the Transatlantic Economic Partnership.”
17  
However, the U.S. pressure had little impact on the outcome of the EU regulatory process.
18 
Eventually, this led to the U.S. decision to take the matter to the WTO. Taking the matter to 
the WTO is a measure of last resort. Thus far, the North Atlantic states have refrained from 
talking high-profile regulatory issues to the WTO out of concern that the rulings and 
subsequent non-adherence to them could undermine the legitimacy of WTO dispute 
settlements which have served as valuable tools in removing trade barriers elsewhere.
19 
The outcome of the pending WTO case will not only have an impact on the future of 
GM regulation but it will also substantially affect the  global trade regime in its relationship 
to environmental regulation no matter what the outcome will be. As of this writing little can 
be speculated about the panel’s findings whose final report is scheduled for June 2005. 
Issuance of the report has been delayed twice (originally planned for September 2004, then 
for March 2005) in order to hear additional experts. Some analysts interpret this step as a 
sign for the impact of the EU’s submissions on panel discussions. In its submissions the EU 
had highlighted the complex nature of GMOs for which rules in the SPS Agreement are 
said to be too narrowly defined. 
GMOs are a good example for successful internationalization of European regulation. 
The EU Commission bundled the member states’ interests and represented them 
internationally. As a consequence the United States had little influence on the development 
or European rules and their internationalization.  
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Climate Change Politics 
 
Climate Change  is the issue that  has  gained  most prominence in international 
environmental politics during the past fifteen years.20 This is a result of both the ecological 
stakes and the political challenges involved. Climate change is caused by the emission of 
certain substances which are a byproduct of basic human activities. Especially combustion 
of fossil fuels for energy generation and some  agricultural practices  produce so-called 
“greenhouse gases” (GHGs) which amplify the Earth’s natural greenhouse effect and thus 
contribute to global warming.21  Recently, a number of prominent commentators have 
characterized climate change as this century’s greatest problem.
22 
 
 
The UN Climate Change Regime 
 
Climate policy did not become a significant political issue until the late 1970s. Despite a 
number of high-level conferences and alarming assessments in particular of US scientists it 
took until 1988 that the  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was founded. As a 
scientific advisory body to the UN, the IPCC surveys and comments on the current state of 
climate change research. Since its first report in 1990, which led to the UN General 
Assembly’s decision to initiate negotiations on a climate change protocol, the IPCC has had 
a strong impact on climate change politics.  
Just in time for the  1992  United  Nations  Conference on  Environment and 
Development in  Rio de Janeiro,  the  UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was drafted. Already 154 states signed it at the so-called Earth Summit. The 
convention entered into force on 21 March 1994. With 190 signatories as of today, it enjoys 
almost global acceptance.23The agreement establishes the basics of future climate change 
policy. As ultimate goal of climate protection, Article 2, UNFCCC calls for the stabilization 
of GHGs in the atmosphere at a level which avoids “dangerous”  human impact on the 
climate system. Concrete measures were to  be  negotiated in follow-up Conferences of the 
Parties (COPs). Since the first COP meeting in 1995 these have been held annually. 
Already, COP-1 passed the so-called Berlin Mandate which  called for negotiations on 
a protocol to   amendment to the convention  incorporating concrete and binding GHG 
reductions for industrialized nations. In December 1997, the unanimous adoption of the 
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Kyoto Protocol established this aim. It requires industrialized states to reduce their GHG 
emissions by an average 5.2 per cent.24 The parties then needed another four years until the 
end of 2001to generate  agreement on the details  for implementing the Protocol. After 
another three years of uncertainty the protocol finally entered into force on 16 February 
2005. Since the US withdrawal from the Protocol in early 2001 the pivotal role to sign the 
agreement into force was left to Russia. At least 55 states representing 55 per cent or more 
of industrialized country emissions were required for the protocol to enter into force. This 
mark could only be reached if one of the two emission giants signed. 
  
 
The EU and US Positions 
 
Both the Unites States and the E uropean Union are members of UNFCCC and have exerted 
much influence on the evolving climate change regime.  However, f rom the onset of 
negotiations the USA was criticized for its hesitant stance and was identified as the primary 
culprit if negotiations were to fail. Still, much effort was placed on bringing the United 
States on board – participation by the world’s largest GHG emitter was considered  to be 
crucial  for the success of the agreement. In addition to its ecological significance, the 
United States was  also  considered a potential leader  in developing technologies to reduce 
emissions.
25 
Two primary lines  of conflict existed since the UNFCCC negotiations and continued 
to play a major role in the further development of the climate regime: One separated 
industrialized countries – and especially the United States – and developing states; the other 
split the developed world internally – primarily the United States and the EU. With regard 
to the first controversy, the main cause was the U.S. refusal to consider a global climate 
protection fund  as well as  technology transfer  from rich to poor countries. Dominating 
negotiations, however, was the dispute among the industrialized states. Contrary to most 
European states, the United States vehemently opposed specific targets and timetables for 
emission reductions. 
The  divide  between the U.S. and European governments continued throughout the 
regime building process and concerned the most important issues at stake.26 First, the EU 
considered the IPCC findings as a scientific guidepost for political action and – following 
the precautionary principle – as  evidence for the urgency to act. To the c ontrary, the US  
highlighted perceived deficits of the reports and demanded more scientific certainty as a 
precondition for political action. Second, the United States throughout negotiations argued 
for less ambitious and more flexible reduction targets, whereas Europeans demanded bolder 
and binding  ones. Finally, the EU supported the application of the  so-called  common but 
differentiated  principle.  Enshrined already  in  the  UNFCCC, the principle attributes 
                                                   
24 The  (then)  fifteen members of the European Union and some other European countries accepted an 8% 
reduction target of their average 2008-2012 GHG emissions as compared to emissions in the base year 1990; the 
USA agree to a 7%, Japan toa 6% reduction. The Russian Federation signed up to a  stabilization of emissions on 
its 1990 levels, whereas Norway and Australia were allowed to increase emissions by 1% and 8% respectively. 
25 In 2000, U.S. emissions accounted for more than one-fifth (20.6%) of global emissions. I.e., the U.S. share is 
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responsibility for climate change to all states, but requires industrialized states to take the 
lead on reductions. In contrast, the United States pushed for an inclusion  at least of major 
developing countries into binding commitments. 
Overall, the  EU managed to prevail on all three issues: The IPCC continues to be 
regarded as the primary scientific authority  for  climate change. The Kyoto Protocol 
contains binding targets and these apply exclusively to industrialized states. With regard to 
the instruments chosen to achieve those goals, however, the assessment is not that clear; for 
a long time Europeans favored direct regulation and considered emission-trading  – as 
favored by the United States  – as "indulgency trade", the buying off of pollution sins. In 
this  regard, Americans  prevailed with  their  demand for maximum flexibility. Only in the 
late 1990s did the EU adopt emission trading – today even the key strategy for its climate 
policy. Implementation of the GHG emission trading system in the EU-15 in January 2005 
made the EU the first entity worldwide to have such a legally binding mechanism in place. 
Although the United States was instrumental in creating the instrument,  its own industry 
cannot partake in this system. 
 
 
The European Leadership Role 
 
Against the backdrop of U.S.  resistance,  Europeans finally managed to dominate climate 
change politics and save the Kyoto Protocol. Three specific dates highlight this European 
success story: 
On 11 December 1997 no agreement could be reached by the official end of 
negotiations. Still,  and  despite differences within the European delegation (and pressure 
exerted by the United States), Europeans succeeded with their objective of binding and 
ambitious targets for industrialized states and managed to avert further weakening of 
commitments by the U.S. delegation. Furthermore this date is important since the EU took 
over  the responsibility for GHG reduction as a bubble  –  i.e., since then the EU is 
responsible for meeting  a joint reduction commitment. Therefore, it has created an internal 
distribution mechanism  that allocates specific  reduction targets to its members. As a 
consequence, the EU gained enormously in authority over the climate change policies of its 
members. 
The second date  important for  the  European  road to leadership  is  the official  U.S. 
withdrawal from Kyoto in the end of March 2001. Up to this point the United States was 
considered key for the development of an effective international climate change regime. 
Many believe that President Bush intended to strike a final blow to Kyoto with his rejection 
of the treaty; the US statement of spring 2001  (“Kyoto is dead”) is very clear in this 
respect.
27 To the very least, the question now loomed who was to lead international climate 
change politics from this point forward. The EU accepted this challenge and soon  realized 
that it needed a more forward- and outward-looking strategy to take on this task. Not only 
did it manage to generate a higher degree of policy cohesion within Europe; it now  also 
successfully prepared for pending negotiations as a unified actor.
28 Many were surprised to 
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see the November 2001 COP  at Marrakech not only survive the U.S. retreat but also result 
in the long-sought implementation rules for the Protocol. 
Most importantly the EU managed to pull Russia on board the Kyoto  enterprise. In its 
rescue mission for the Protocol, the EU did not hesitate to offer Russia and other countries 
generous credits for GHG sequestration in order to convince them to ratify the Protocol. A 
combination of continued pressure, the offer of extended cooperation in the energy sector, 
and support for  its WTO bid finally b(r)ought Russia in.29 On 16 February 2005, the EU 
and its climate allies celebrated the protocol’s entry-into-force – this is the third important 
date. 
 
 
Transatlantic and Inner-American Dissent 
 
Climate change is one of the most contested issues in the transatlantic relationship. Since 
the US retreat from the Kyoto Protocol, the issue has become a symbol for the underlying 
transatlantic rift.  However, in the embarrassment over George W. Bush’s decision  it is 
often overlooked that the Kyoto Protocol never stood a realistic chance of ratification. 
Contrary to Europe, in the US  no domestic consensus for more climate protection exists.
30 
During both Clinton administrations a rhetorically ambitious White House was 
consistently blocked by Congress. Half a year before the Kyoto  COP  the Senate 
unanimously passed the so-called Byrd-Hagel resolution which laid out the conditions any 
international agreement on climate change would have to meet in order to be ratified into 
domestic law .
31 As a consequence the Clinton administration had to significantly tone down 
its negotiation position. Congress suspected the  president repeatedly of striving for an 
implementation of Kyoto  through the back door.32 At subsequent COPs  members of 
Congress  organized press conference to oppose statements by the executive. As a 
consequence Clinton never submitted the protocol to the Senate for ratification. 
With George W. Bush’s inauguration as president, the initiative in US climate change 
policies shifted to the legislative. However,  all important proposals  still failed due to both 
resistance within Congress  and  clear opposition by the President. Bush’s Global Climate 
Change Initiative  – announced as an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol  – has received 
disappointed  reception internationally. Announced as the U.S. return to leadership in 
climate change, the plan aims at reducing the carbon intensity of the U.S. economy by 18 
per cent until 2012. However, this figure which might sound impressive at first is roughly 
in line with the business-as-usual scenario of the U.S. economy’s decarbonization. In total 
U.S. emissions, however, the scenario would result in a  12 percent increase over the same 
period – equivalent to a share more than 30 percent above the Kyoto targets to which the 
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related to climate change. 16  Alexander Ochs und Marcus Schaper 
   
Clinton administration had subscribed. 33  To Europeans this plan  was particularly 
disappointing because  EPA head Christie Todd Whitman had assured them only briefly 
before  that the  president would live up to his election promise and enact binding CO2 
emission targets for power plants.34 
All in all, fifteen years of national U.S. climate change policy have resulted in little 
more than a few research and technology programs. Internationally, the United States is 
isolated from the rest of the world. Accompanied only by Australia, Liechtenstein, and 
Monaco it is  one of  only  four  industrialized states, that  have  not ratified Kyoto. 
Interestingly, EU domestic politics which  finally  resulted in a unified position are 
diametrically opposed to the U.S. standstill. The EU managed to bundle its members’ 
interests and has used this as an opportunity to assume an international leadership role. 
Most experts agree that the resulting Kyoto Protocol is the single  most important 
international environmental regime. But there is also no doubt that the Protocol only marks 
a first small step on a long and winding road which will only reveal relatively late whether 
the globe’s climate system can be preserved from a dangerous change.  
 
 
Equal Partners with Leadership Qualities? 
 
This paper  concerns itself with very distinct examples of transatlantic environmental 
politics. These cases differ substantially with regard to the roles played by the EU and the 
United States. Int ernational environmental standards for ECAs are the result of U.S.,, 
norms for GMOs the consequence of EU initiatives. In  each case the initiators  seized 
leadership and had considerable influence on the outcome. In climate change politics, 
however, the Europeans took over leadership only after the United States withdrew from 
the international arena and only then managed to bring the Kyoto treaty into force. 
The extent to which  a party can successfully influence negotiations  is largely a 
function of  the preferences of its domestic actors. Other authors have identified national 
coalitions between environmental activists and industry as  important preconditions for 
strong leadership  at the international level. The examples discussed above show that 
agreement between the  legislative and executive in the U.S., and among member states of 
the EU , deserve equal attention. 
In the past, the United States  was  often  successful in internationalizing domestic 
environmental  regulation, despite high adjustment costs for European states. This can be 
attributed  primarily  to the European tendency to build a “European position”  late in an 
issue and only in reaction to a U.S. initiative. Such attempts of finding a common response 
in the past  often failed, and thus provided the United States the opportunity to pull 
individual European states to its side and thus preempt strong and concerted opposition to 
its initiatives. 
Climate change politics and GMOs are important experiences for the EU as they can 
serve as templates for international regime building in the absence of U.S. leadership.  Such 
experiences, however, should not lead  Europeans to automatically position themselves as a 
challenger of the United States. On the contrary, ECAs as well as climate change show that 
                                                   
33 E.g. Analysis of President Bush's Climate Change Plan. (2002). Pew Center on Global Climate Change. 
34 Semple, Robert B. Jr (2005). Christie Whitman Rides to the Defense of Her Grand Old Party. NYT online, 1 
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most challenges can  ultimately  only be solved through cooperative negotiations. Good 
initiatives deserving   support  can originate on both sides of the Atlantic; the discussion 
above purposely  avoids a qualitative interpretation of the competing positions.  In 
retrospect,  however, it is undeniable that in each case the “greener” position  finally 
prevailed – although with some concessions.  
The greatest obstacle to cooperative transatlantic solutions is a lack of understanding 
for  the diverging interpretations of a policy challenge of the other side.  Although the 
climate change discourse in Europe was driven by concerns of the ecological threat, in the 
United States, competitive concerns – especially with regard to China as a potential future 
rival – played a commanding  role. The GMO debate, primarily concerned with consumer 
protection in Europe, was framed in trade terms in the United States. In contrast, the U.S. 
case for greening ECA operations was argued in environmental terms, whereas European 
politicians referred to potential job losses as a consequence of introducing environmental 
standards. It is not surprising that diverging domestic discourses  have  led to differing 
proposals for international solutions. But these  differing opinions need not escalate  into 
transatlantic conflict as is often the case due mainly to the short-sighted power calculations 
by domestic policymakers. 
Real solutions to complex problems  – such as those currently on the environmental 
agenda  – can be negotiated successfully  only when competing interpretations of the 
problem as well as proposed solutions are recognized and accepted  by the other side. Only 
under these conditions will a  common win-set of jointly acceptable solutions be identified. 
Such cooperation could be stimulated through increased transatlantic exchange on the level 
of expert bureaucrats as well as  of  key political, societal, and economic actors,  guided by 
the recognition of mutual benefits of cooperation.
35 
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